On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

inner rationality, rising up into the light of day, into the pure form of the Idea, which is the essence of every science and, in philosophy as the absolute science, is this pure Idea itself; of that peculiar and yet free scientific formation of a science, geometry gives a brilliant example, envied by the other sciences. Just as little is it the case that all reality must be denied to sciences constituted like those named above, on the ground that they are properly empirical; for just as every part or every side of philosophy is capable of being an independent science, so each is thereby immediately also an independent and complete image, and can be taken up and presented in the shape of an image drawn from an intuition which purely and happily keeps itself free from contamination by fixed concepts.

The completion of science, however, requires that intuition and the image be united with the logical and taken up into the purely ideal, just as it requires that the separated, though true, science be relieved of its singularity, and its principle be cognized according to its higher connection and necessity, and precisely thereby itself be completely liberated. This alone also makes it possible to cognize the boundaries of the science, boundaries of which, without this, it must remain in ignorance, because otherwise it would have to stand above itself and cognize the nature of its principle according to its determinacy in the absolute form; for from this cognition there would immediately follow for it the cognition and certainty of the extent of the equality of its various determinacies; but as it is, it can only relate to its boundaries empirically, and must now make false attempts to overstep them, now suppose them narrower than they are, and therefore undergo quite unexpected extensions; just as geometry too — which, for example, knows how to demonstrate the incommensurability of the diameter and the side of the square, but not that of the diameter and the circumference of a circle 1 — gives an example, and still

  1. Fichte prides himself somewhat (in the Introduction to his Natural Right) on the simplicity of his insight into the ground of this latter incommensurability, namely, that the curved is, in earnest, not straight. The superficiality of this ground is self-evident, and is also immediately refuted by the first incommensurability, that of the diameter and the side of the square — both of which are straight — as well as by the quadrature of the parabola. As for the aid that, in the same place, is sought from sound common sense against mathematical infinity — namely, that a polygon of infinitely many sides cannot, precisely because it is a polygon of infinitely many sides, be measured — this same aid would, on the one hand, have to be available also against the infinite progress in which the absolute Idea is supposed to realize itself; and on the other hand, nothing at all is thereby determined about the main point — positive infinity, which is not an infinite quantity but identity — namely, whether this is to be posited; which amounts to saying that nothing is determined about commensurability or incommensurability at all. ↩︎

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  1. Editorial Note Avatar
    Editorial Note

    Editorial Note:

    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    • p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    • p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    • p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    • p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    • p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    • p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    • p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    • p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    • p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    • p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    • p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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