On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

true justice corresponding to the determinacy of the laws is, in the concrete exercise of judicial power, impossible in itself. As for the first: since the absolute is supposed to be within determinacies as such, it is only the infinite, and it is precisely the same empirical infinity, and an in-itself endless determinability, that is posited in the thought of comparing a determinate measure with an absolutely indeterminate line, or a determinate line with an absolutely indeterminate measure — of measuring an infinite line, or of absolutely dividing a determinate line. As for the second: of the likewise infinitely many, and infinitely differently shaped, intuitions that are the object of judicial activity, each is determined ever more manifoldly by the growing multitude of determinations; that formation of distinctions through legislation makes each individual intuition more distinguishable and more cultivated, and the expansion of legislation is not an approach toward the goal of a positive perfection — which, as shown above, has no truth here — but only the formal moment of increasing cultivation. And in order that, within this manifold, the one of judicial intuition of right and of judgment may organize itself, may become a true one and a whole, it is absolutely necessary that each individual determinacy be modified — that is, precisely insofar as it presents itself, as an absolute existing for itself, as law, be in part sublated, so that its being-absolute is not respected; and there can be no talk of a pure application, for a pure application would be the positing of individual determinacies to the exclusion of others; but through their being, these others make, just as much, the demand that they be taken into consideration, so that the counter-effect, determined not by parts but by the whole, may itself be a whole. To this clear and determinate cognition, the empty hope and the formal thought of an absolute legislation, as well as of an adjudication withdrawn from the inner judgment of the judge, must succumb.

It has been shown, in the system of reality just considered, that absolute ethical life must comport itself negatively toward it; within it, the Absolute, as it appears under the fixed determinacy of that system, is posited as negatively absolute, as infinity, which presents itself, over against the opposition, as a formal, relative, abstract unity — in that negative comportment, hostile; in this latter, itself under its dominion; in neither indifferent toward it. But the unity that is the indifference of the opposed terms, and that annihilates and comprehends them within itself, and the unity that is only a formal indifference, or the identity of the relationship of subsisting realities, must themselves be simply one, through a complete taking-up of the relationship into indifference itself. That is to say, the absolutely ethical must, as shape — for the relationship is the abstraction of the side of shape —

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  1. Editorial Note Avatar
    Editorial Note

    Editorial Note:

    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    • p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    • p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    • p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    • p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    • p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    • p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    • p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    • p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    • p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    • p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    • p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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