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On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

[p. 468]

|468| recognises itself merely in its contingency and particularity, which recognition is the sentimentality and the unethicality of impotence. Or when the ethical relates to relations of individuals to individuals, then it is the pure intuition and ideality which is, e.g., in the trust of a deposit, which is to be held fast and from which the intrusion of formal unity and of the thought of the possibility of other determinations is to be kept away. The expression of that unity of intuition: a property of another entrusted to me is the property of another entrusted to me and nothing else besides, has an entirely different meaning from the generally expressing tautology of practical legislation: a foreign property entrusted to me is a foreign property entrusted to me; for over against this proposition stands just as well the other: a non-property of the other entrusted to me is non-property of the other; i.e. a determinacy which is raised into the concept is thereby ideal, and the one opposed to it can just as well be posited. On the other hand, the expression of intuition contains a This, a living relation and absolute presence, with which possibility itself is absolutely bound up and a possibility separated from it or an otherness absolutely annihilated, in which possible otherness unethicality lies.

If now the unity of practical reason were not even this positive unity of intuition, but had solely the negative meaning of annihilating the determinate, then it would express purely the essence of negative reason or of infinity, of the absolute concept. But because infinity is fixed and separated from the absolute, it shows itself, in its essence, to be the opposite of itself, and mocks the reflection which wants to hold it fast and grasp an absolute unity in it, in that it absolutely also brings about the opposite of this, a difference and multiplicity, and so between this opposition, which

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One response to “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right”

  1. Cross-reference Avatar
    Cross-reference

    Cross-reference:
    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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