On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the concept of a determinacy or a power, arbitrarily sets its own boundary in relation to a determinate science; the determinate science is nothing other than the continuing presentation and analysis (taking the word in its higher sense) of how that which philosophy leaves undeveloped as a simple determinacy branches out again and is itself a totality. The possibility of such a development lies, formally, in the fact that the law of absolute form and of totality is immediately present in the Idea, according to which a determinacy is to be further cognized and developed; the real possibility, however, is present in that such a determinacy or power, not developed by philosophy, is not an abstraction or a truly simple atom, but, like everything in philosophy, is reality — and a reality is reality precisely because it is a totality and itself the system of the powers; to present the power as such is the development that belongs to the determinate science.

It follows from this that we might say, for the time being, that a good part of what is called the positive sciences of right — perhaps the whole of it — would fall within a philosophy fully developed and extended; and that, precisely because they constitute themselves as sciences in their own right, they are neither excluded from philosophy nor opposed to it; through the being-for-itself and the empirical differentiation of this body of sciences, no true distinction from philosophy is thereby established. That they call themselves empirical sciences — partly because they have their applicability in the actual world and wish to make their laws and manner of procedure valid before the common mode of representation as well, partly because they relate to the individual systems of existing constitutions and legislations, and belong to a determinate people as well as to a determinate time — this determines no difference that would necessarily exclude them from philosophy; for nothing needs to be so applicable to actuality, and so justified before the universal mode of representation — that is, the truly universal one, for there are common modes of representation that are, in this respect, quite particular — as that which comes from philosophy; just as, likewise, nothing can be so individual, living, and subsisting as that very same thing. In order to be able to speak of the relation of these sciences to philosophy, a difference must first be fixed and determined, by which they are positive sciences.

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  1. Editorial Note Avatar
    Editorial Note

    Editorial Note:

    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    • p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    • p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    • p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    • p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    • p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    • p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    • p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    • p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    • p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    • p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    • p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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