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On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

[p. 480]

|480| retribution rational; for through it the crime is subdued. A determinacy + A, which the crime has posited, is supplemented by the positing of – A and so both annihilated; or viewed positively: with the determinacy + A the opposed – A is connected for the criminal and both equally posited, since the crime posited only one. Thus punishment is the restoration of freedom, and the criminal has remained free, or rather been made free, just as the punisher has acted rationally and freely. In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and something absolute, which hereby has its respect and fear in itself; it comes from freedom and remains, even as subduing, in freedom. If, on the other hand, punishment is represented as coercion, then it is posited merely as a determinacy and as something absolutely finite, carrying no rationality in itself, and falls wholly under the common concept of a determinate thing, against another, or of a commodity, for which something else, namely the crime, is to be bought; the state, as judicial power, keeps a market in determinacies which are called crimes and which are for sale to it against other determinacies, and the code of laws is the price list.

[III]

Cross-reference: Absolute ethical life. In the Groundlines, § 142 ff.; on the relation of the individual and the people § 257 f.

But as null as these abstractions and the relation of externality arising from them are, the moment of the negatively absolute or of infinity, which in this example is designated as determining the relation of crime and punishment, is a moment of the absolute itself and must be shown in absolute ethical life, and we shall grasp the versatility of the absolute form or of infinity in its necessary moments and show how they determine the shape of absolute ethical life, from which the true concept and the relation of the

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One response to “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right”

  1. Cross-reference Avatar
    Cross-reference

    Cross-reference:
    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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