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On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

[p. 478]

|478| and if, e.g., there were talk of a concrete freedom, the freedom of the individual, then that being of a determinacy, and thereby mere empirical freedom as a possibility of choice, would be [posited], and thus empirical necessity too and the possibility of coercion, in general the opposition of universality and individuality, posited. For the individual is an individuality, and freedom is an annihilating of individuality; through individuality the individual is immediately under determinacies, thereby something external is present for it and thereby coercion possible. But it is one thing to posit determinacies in the individual under the form of infinity, another to posit them absolutely in it. The determinacy under the form of infinity is thereby at the same time sublated, and the individual is only as a free being; that is, since determinacies are posited in it, it is the absolute indifference of these determinacies, and in this consists formally its ethical nature; just as organisation, and hence – because only in organisation is there totality – the positive of ethical life consists in this, that, insofar as individuals in general – be it towards themselves or something else – are different and have a relationship to something external, this externality itself be indifferent and a living relationship. – But the indifference of the individual as an individual is, in relation to the being of the determinacies, a negative one; but where its being as individuality, i.e. a negation positively insurmountable for it, a determinacy through which the external as such holds itself fast, is really posited, there remains to it only the absolutely negative absoluteness or infinity – the absolute negation of – A as well as of + A, or that it absolutely takes up this being-individual into the concept. Since – A is something external to the determinacy + A of the subject, it is through this relation in alien power; but because it can likewise posit negatively, sublate and alienate its + A as a determinacy, it remains, in the face of

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  1. Cross-reference Avatar
    Cross-reference

    Cross-reference:
    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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