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On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

[p. 456]

|456| opposition reality is in multiplicity, but ideality in unity.

In what is called practical reason there is therefore to be recognised only the formal Idea of the identity of the ideal and the real, and this Idea was supposed to be the absolute point of indifference in these systems; but that Idea does not emerge from difference and the ideal does not arrive at reality, for notwithstanding that in this practical reason the ideal and the real are identical, the real nonetheless remains absolutely opposed. This real is essentially posited outside reason, and practical reason, whose essence is conceived as a relation of causality to the many, – as an identity which [is] absolutely affected with a difference and does not go out from appearance, – is only in difference against it. This science of the ethical, which speaks of the absolute identity of the ideal and the real, thus does not act in accordance with its words, but its ethical reason is in truth and in its essence a non-identity of the ideal and the real.

Ethical reason was previously determined as the absolute in the form of unity, and hereby, in that it is itself posited as a determinacy, it seems immediately in this determination to be posited just as essentially with an opposition. The difference, however, is that true reality and the absolute of it is entirely free of this opposition to nature and that it is absolute identity of the ideal and the real. The absolute is cognised according to its Idea as this identity of differents, whose determinacy is, for the one to be unity, for the other multiplicity, and this determinacy is ideal, i.e. it is only in infinity according to the concept of it shown above: this determinacy is sublated just as much as it is posited; each, unity as well as multiplicity, whose identity the absolute is, is itself unity of the one and the many. But the one, whose ideal determination is multiplicity, is the subsisting of the opposed,

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One response to “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right”

  1. Cross-reference Avatar
    Cross-reference

    Cross-reference:
    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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