On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

is posited as well, the syntheses, insofar as they are meant to have not merely the negative significance of the sublation of one part of the opposition, but also a positive significance of intuition, can only represent empirical intuitions.

These two ways of scientifically treating natural right must first be characterized more closely; the first with regard to the manner in which the absolute Idea appears in it according to the moments of the absolute form; the other, as to how the infinite, or the negative absolute, seeks in vain to bring itself to a positive organization; the discussion of this latter attempt will lead directly to a consideration of the nature and the relation of the sciences of the ethical, as philosophical sciences, as well as their relation to that which is called positive science of right, which, though it holds itself outside philosophy, and by itself renouncing philosophy believes it can withdraw itself from its critique, nonetheless at the same time also claims to have an absolute subsistence and a true reality — a pretension that cannot be overlooked.

As for the way of treating natural right which we have called the empirical way, in the first place it is not at all possible to engage, as regards their matter, with the determinacies and relational concepts themselves which it seizes upon and asserts under the name of principles; rather, it is precisely this isolating and fixing of determinacies that must be negated. The nature of this isolating brings with it that the scientific element can only concern the form of unity, and that, from an organic relation with the manifold qualities into which it can be divided, some determinacy must be singled out — provided these are not merely to be enumerated — in order to arrive at a unity out of this multitude, and this determinacy must be regarded as the essence of the relation; but precisely by this the totality of the organic is not attained, and the rest of it, excluded from that chosen determinacy, comes under the dominion of this determinacy, which is elevated to essence and purpose. Thus, for example, in order to cognize the relation of marriage, now the begetting of children, now the community of goods, and so on, is posited, and from such a determinacy, which is made into the law as the essential element, the whole organic relation is determined and contaminated; or, regarding punishment, now the determinacy of the moral improvement of the criminal, now of the damage done, now of the representation of the punishment in others, now of the criminal’s own representation of it preceding the crime, now of the necessity that this representation be made real, that the threat be carried out, and so on, is seized upon, and such a single feature is made into the purpose and essence of the whole;

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  1. Editorial Note Avatar
    Editorial Note

    Editorial Note:

    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    • p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    • p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    • p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    • p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    • p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    • p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    • p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    • p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    • p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    • p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    • p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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