On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

An empiricism would assert itself against such theory and philosophy with the greatest right, and would regard the multitude of principles, purposes, laws, duties, and rights not as something absolute, but as distinctions important for the cultivation through which its own intuition becomes clearer to it — if it were itself pure, and remained so. But when empiricism seems to enter into combat with theory, it usually turns out that the one, like the other, is an intuition already contaminated and sublated beforehand by reflection, and a distorted reason; and that what passes itself off as empiricism is only the weaker party in abstraction, and is that which, with less self-activity, has not itself extracted, distinguished, and fixed its own limitations, but is caught up in such limitations as have become fixed in general culture, are present as common sense, and therefore seem to have been taken up immediately from experience. Between such a fixed distortion of intuition and the abstractions only now being fixed, the picture of the conflict is necessarily just as motley as they themselves are; each uses against the other now an abstraction, now a so-called experience, and on both sides it is empiricism breaking itself against empiricism, and limitation shattering itself against limitation — now a great show of principles and laws against philosophy, and its exclusion as an incompetent judge over such absolute truths in which the understanding has become firmly lodged, now an abuse of it for the sake of ratiocination and an appeal to it.

This relative right, which has been conceded to empiricism — when intuition is what rules within it — against the mixing of the empirical and the reflected, refers, as will be recalled, to its unconscious inward aspect; but the middle between the two, between that inward aspect and its outward aspect, consciousness, is the side on which its deficiency, and therefore its one-sidedness, lies; and its drive toward the scientific, and its incomplete linkage and mere contact with the concept — through which it thereby only contaminates itself — stems from the necessity that plurality and finitude absolutely submerge themselves in infinity, or in universality.

It is, however, the side of infinity that constitutes the principle of the apriority opposed to the empirical — to a consideration of which we now turn.

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  1. Editorial Note Avatar
    Editorial Note

    Editorial Note:

    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    • p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    • p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    • p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    • p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    • p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    • p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    • p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    • p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    • p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    • p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    • p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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