On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

opposed determinacies is just as indifferent as the other; either can be conceived as a quality, and this conceiving pronounced as a law. If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition can be made from it: property is property and nothing else; this tautological production is the legislating done by this practical reason: property, if property exists, must be property; but if the opposed determinacy — the negation of property — is posited, then the legislating of that very same practical reason yields the tautology: non-property is non-property; if there is no property, then that which would be property must be sublated. But it is precisely what is at issue to demonstrate that property must exist; the whole matter turns solely on that which lies outside the capacity of this practical legislating of pure reason, namely, deciding which of two opposed determinacies must be posited; but that this should already have occurred beforehand, and one of the opposed determinacies already be posited in advance, is what pure reason demands, and only then can it carry out its now-superfluous legislating.

But the analytic unity and tautology of practical reason is not merely something superfluous, but, in the turn it is given, something false, and it must be recognized as the principle of unethical conduct. Through the mere taking up of a determinacy into the form of unity, the nature of that determinacy’s being is supposed to change; and the determinacy, which by its very nature has another determinacy opposed to it — of which one is the negation of the other, and for that very reason neither is something absolute (and it is a matter of indifference to the function of practical reason which of the two it is, since it supplies only the empty form) — is supposed, through this conjoining with the form of pure unity, to be itself made into something absolute, into law and duty; but wherever a determinacy and particularity is elevated into something in-itself, there is a violation of reason, and, in relation to the ethical, unethical conduct is posited. — This transformation of the conditioned, unreal into something unconditioned and absolute is easy to recognize in its illegitimacy, and to track down along its devious path. The determinacy, taken up into the form of pure unity, or of formal identity, yields, when the determinate concept is expressed as a proposition, the tautology of the formal proposition: determinacy A is determinacy A. The form, or, in the proposition, the identity of subject and predicate, is something absolute, but only a negative or formal absolute, which does not concern determinacy A itself in the least; this content is, for the form, something utterly hypothetical. But the absoluteness that belongs to the proposition according to its form acquires, in practical reason, a wholly different meaning; for it is now also transferred onto

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  1. Editorial Note Avatar
    Editorial Note

    Editorial Note:

    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    • p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    • p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    • p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    • p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    • p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    • p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    • p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    • p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    • p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    • p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    • p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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