On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

or does not remain, its sublation is in no case possible. But a maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely because it expresses the sublation of a determinacy, absolutely rational, and therefore absolutely moral; for the rational, on its negative side, is the indifference of determinacies, the being-sublated of the conditioned. Thus the determinacy of helping the poor expresses the sublation of the determinacy that is poverty; the maxim whose content is that determinacy, when tested by raising it to the principle of a universal legislation, will prove to be false, for it annihilates itself. If it is thought that the poor are universally helped, then either there are no longer any poor at all, or else there is nothing but poor people, in which case none remain who could help; and so in both cases help would drop away; the maxim, thought as universal, thus sublates itself; but should the determinacy that is the condition of this sublation — namely, poverty — remain, then the possibility of help remains, but only as possibility, not as actuality, as the maxim asserts; if poverty is to remain so that the duty of helping the poor can be exercised, then this very allowing poverty to persist immediately fails to fulfill the duty. So too the maxim of defending one’s fatherland against enemies with honor, and countless others, sublate themselves when thought as the principle of a universal legislation; for that maxim, for instance, so extended, sublates the determinacy of a fatherland as much as that of enemies, and of defense itself.

Just as little as unity has the purely negative meaning of the mere sublation of determinacies, just as little is it the true unity of intuition, or the positive indifference of determinacies; and the comparison with this will make the perverse nature of that unity clearer from another side. For that unity of practical reason is essentially affected by a difference: whether it is posited as the fixing of a determinacy, in which case other determinacies are immediately excluded by it, posited negatively; or as an analytic proposition, in which case its identity, this its form, contradicts its content. This can also be grasped as follows: as a proposition, it contradicts, with its content, the demand made on a proposition that it be a judgment; something was supposed to be said with the proposition, but with the identical proposition nothing is said, for it is no judgment, because the relation of subject to predicate is merely formal, and no difference between them whatsoever is posited. Or let unity be taken as universality: then it has its bearing entirely on an empirical manifold, and the determinacy is opposed, as a present one, to an infinite multitude of empirically other ones. The unity of intuition, by contrast, is the indifference of the determinacies that make up a whole, not a fixing of them as separated and opposed,

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  1. Editorial Note Avatar
    Editorial Note

    Editorial Note:

    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    • p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    • p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    • p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    • p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    • p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    • p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    • p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    • p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    • p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    • p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    • p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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