[p. 521]
|521| a positive just as much as the particular, for, as was shown earlier, it becomes positive through the form of opposition in which it is present in that abstraction. But the real is absolutely an identity of the universal and the particular, and therefore that abstraction, and the positing of the one of the opposites which arise through the abstraction, of the universal as something existing in itself, cannot take place. In general, if formal thinking is consistent, then, when it grasps the particular as the positive, it must have absolutely no content at all; in the pure reason of formal thinking every multiplicity and distinguishability must drop out altogether, and it is not at all foreseeable how it should arrive even at the most meagre multiplicity of rubrics and chapters; just as those who grasp the essence of the organism as the abstraction of a vital force must, properly speaking, grasp the limbs and the brain and the heart and all the viscera as something particular, contingent and positive, and leave them out.
Because, like everything living, the ethical too is absolutely an identity of the universal and the particular, it is an individuality and shape; it bears particularity, necessity, relation, i.e. relative identity, within itself, but indifferentiated, assimilated, and thereby it is free in it, and this, which can be regarded by reflection as particularity, is not a positive nor something opposed to the living individual, which is thereby connected with contingency and necessity, but alive; this side is its inorganic nature, but in shape and individuality it an-organises itself. Thus, to name the most general, the determinate climate of a people and its period belong, in the formation of the general kind, to necessity, and of the widely extended chain of this necessity only one link falls upon its present, which is to be comprehended, on the former side, from geography, on the other from

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