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On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

[p. 467]

|467| relation to an empirical manifold, and the determinacy is opposed, as present, to an infinite multitude of empirically other ones. The unity of intuition, on the other hand, is the indifference of the determinacies which make up a whole, not a fixing of them as separated and opposed, but a gathering together and objectifying of them; and hereby, since this indifference and the differing determinacies are absolutely united, it is no separation – of the former as possibility, of the latter as actualities, or of the latter itself partly as possible, partly as actual -, but absolute presence. And in this power of intuition and presence lies the power of ethical life in general and naturally also of ethical life in particular, with which that legislating reason is in the first instance concerned and from which rather precisely that form of the concept, of formal unity and of universality, is absolutely to be kept away, for it is precisely this through which the essence of ethical life is immediately sublated, in that it makes what is ethically necessary into something contingent by letting it appear in opposition to something else; but the contingent in ethical life – and the contingent is one with the empirically necessary – is unethical. A pain that is, is raised by the power of intuition out of feeling, in which it is an accident and a contingent, into the unity and into the shape of an objective and necessary being for itself, and through this immediate unity, which does not think left and right of possibilities which the formal unity brings about, is maintained in its absolute presence, but through the objectivity of intuiting and the elevation into this unity of being-for-itself is truly separated from the subject and in the fixed intuiting of it made ideal; whereas it, compared through the unity of reflection with other determinacies or thought as a universal and not found universal, is made contingent in both ways, and thereby the subject

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One response to “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right”

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    Cross-reference

    Cross-reference:
    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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