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On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

[p. 455]

|455| is itself again just as much a doubled relation, either the positive one of the subsisting of both or of the being-annihilated of both; but both that subsisting and this being-annihilated are to be understood only as partial, for were that subsisting of both absolute, there would be no relation of the two at all, and were the complete being-annihilated of both posited, there would not be a subsisting of both. This partial subsisting and partial being-negated of both – the opposing of a divisible I to a divisible not-I in the I, i.e. in the relation, for that very reason likewise partial – is the absolute principle of this philosophy. In the first, the positive relation, pure unity is called theoretical, in the negative relation practical reason; and because in the latter the negation of the opposition is the first, and unity therefore the more subsisting, but in the former the subsisting of the opposition is the first, and multiplicity therefore what subsists first and more, practical reason appears here as the real, theoretical reason however as the ideal. – But one sees that this determination belongs entirely to the opposition and to appearance; for pure unity, which is posited as reason, is admittedly negative, ideal, if the opposed, the many, which is thereby the unreasonable, absolutely has a subsisting, just as it appears as more subsisting and more real if the many is posited as negated or rather as to be negated. But that unreasonable many, as nature is posited against reason as pure unity, is unreasonable only because it is posited as the essenceless abstraction of the many and, on the other hand, reason as the essenceless abstraction of the one; considered in itself, however, both that many is absolute unity of the one and the many, as is this unity, and nature or theoretical reason, which is the many, as absolute unity of the one and the many, must rather, conversely, be determined as the real reason; the ethical, which is the unity, as absolute unity of the one and the many, however, as the ideal, because in

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  1. Cross-reference Avatar
    Cross-reference

    Cross-reference:
    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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