[p. 509]
[IV]
Cross-reference: The estates and the relation of the ethical to the juridical: § 201 ff., § 303.
Having thus presented absolute ethical life in the moments of its totality and constructed its Idea, having also annihilated, as essenceless thought-things, the distinction prevailing in relation to it between legality and morality together with the connected abstractions of the universal freedom of a formal practical reason, and, not by some mixing of the two principles but by the sublation of them and the constitution of the absolute ethical identity, having determined the differences of the science of natural right and of morals according to the absolute Idea, we have established that their essence is not an abstraction but the vitality of the ethical and that their difference concerns only the external and negative and that this difference is at the same time the wholly inverted relation to the other, in that according to the latter natural right is to be given the formal and negative, morals however the absolute and positive as essence, but so that even this absolute, according to the truth, is no less a formal and negative and, what is here called formal and negative, is altogether simply nothing at all.
In order still to state the relation of natural right to the positive sciences of right, we now need only pick up its threads where we did not pursue it further, and designate the place where it runs out.
In advance we remark generally that philosophy, through the universality of the concept of a determinacy or of a potency, arbitrarily sets its boundary in relation to a determinate science. The determinate science is nothing other than the continuing presentation and analysis (the word taken in the higher sense) of how that which philosophy leaves undeveloped as a simple determinacy ramifies again and is itself totality. The possibility of such a development, however, lies

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