On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

[p. 487]

|487| pure application there can be no question, for a pure application would be the positing of individual determinacies with exclusion of others. But through their being these equally make the demand that they be taken into consideration, so that the counteraction, determined not by parts but by the whole, may itself be a whole. To this clear and determinate cognition the empty hope and the formal thought both of an absolute legislation and of a pronouncing of right withdrawn from the judge’s inner being must succumb.

It has been shown in the system of reality under consideration that absolute ethical life must conduct itself negatively towards it; in that system the absolute, as it appears under the fixed determinacy of the same, is posited as negative absolute, as infinity, which presents itself in opposition to the antithesis as formal, relative, abstract unity; in that negative conduct hostile, in this latter itself under its dominion, in neither indifferent towards it. But the unity which is the indifference of the opposed and annihilates and comprehends them within itself, and the unity which is merely formal indifference or the identity of the relation of subsisting realities, must themselves be absolutely as one, through the complete taking up of the relation into indifference itself; that is, the absolutely ethical must organise itself completely as shape, for the relation is the abstraction of the side of shape. In that the relation is absolutely made indifferent in the shape, it does not cease to have the nature of a relation; it remains a relation of organic to inorganic nature. But as was shown above, the relation, as side of infinity, is itself a twofold one; at one time insofar as the unity or the ideal, at another insofar as the many or the real is the first and dominant. According to that side it is properly in the shape and in indifference, and the eternal unrest of the concept or of infinity is partly, within the organisation itself, self-consuming

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One response to “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right”

  1. Cross-reference Avatar
    Cross-reference

    Cross-reference:
    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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