On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

appearance of something existing in itself; and if the mass of a people is great, then the part of it that organizes itself within that determinacy is great too; and the consciousness that stands over it in the law carries great weight over the unconscious part of the newly aspiring life. When custom and law were one, determinacy was nothing positive; but just as, with the growth of the individual, the whole does not advance uniformly, so law and custom separate, the living unity that binds the members together weakens, and there is no longer, in the present of the whole, any absolute connection and necessity. Here, then, the individual cannot be recognized out of itself, for its determinacy is without the life that explains and renders it comprehensible; and as the new custom likewise begins to take itself up into laws, an inner contradiction of the laws among themselves must simply emerge. Just as previously in history only one side of the view was in question, and what is necessary was at the same time free, so here, by contrast, necessity is no longer one with freedom, and so far falls entirely to pure history; what has no truly living ground in the present has its ground in a past, that is, a time is to be sought in which the determinacy fixed in law, but now dead, was living custom and in agreement with the rest of legislation. But the effect of the purely historical explanation of laws and institutions reaches no further than precisely for this purpose of cognition; it will overstep its proper determination and truth if, through it, the law that had truth only in a past life is meant to be justified for the present; on the contrary, this historical cognition of the law, which knows how to point out its ground solely in lost customs and a life that has died off, proves precisely that it now, in the living present, lacks understanding and meaning, even though, through the form of law, and through the fact that parts of the whole still have an interest in it and tie their existence to it, it still has power and force.

But for the proper distinction between what is dead and has no truth, and what is still living, a distinction must be recalled which can escape the formal view, and which must prevent what is in itself negative from being taken for living law, and thus the dominance of laws that are in themselves negative from being taken for the animation of the organization. For laws that withdraw individual determinacies and parts from the supreme rule of the whole, exclude its power from them, and constitute exceptions of the individual from the universal, are in themselves something negative, and signs of an incipient death which becomes ever more threatening to life the more the negative and the exceptions multiply, and the more these laws, which tend toward this dissolution, become too powerful for the true laws which constitute the unity of the whole. To the positive and the died-off, then, must be reckoned not only that which belongs wholly to a past

Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

DE

Comments

One response to “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right”

  1. Editorial Note Avatar
    Editorial Note

    Editorial Note:

    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    • p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    • p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    • p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    • p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    • p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    • p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    • p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    • p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    • p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    • p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    • p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

Leave a Reply