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On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

[p. 517]

|517| and reality, but also that a true Idea and genuine principle is misjudged from the side of its limit and posited outside the potency in which it has its truth and thereby wholly loses its truth. That a principle belongs to a potency is the side of its determinacy; but in the potency itself this determinacy is just as much made indifferent and present as really permeated by the Idea and thereby a true principle; and then it is recognised, as the Idea appearing in these determinacies as its shape, only as the principle of this potency and thereby as the limit and conditionedness of the same. But it is wholly torn from its truth if it is made absolute in its conditionedness or even extended over the nature of other potencies. The absolute clear unity of ethical life is absolute and living in this, that neither a single potency nor the persistence of the potencies in general can be fixed, but that, just as it eternally extends them, it equally absolutely folds them together and sublates them and enjoys itself in undeveloped unity and clarity and, in relation to the potencies, sure of its inner life and indivisible, now does damage to the one through the other, now passes wholly into the one and annihilates the others, just as in general from this movement it equally withdraws into absolute rest, in which all are sublated. On the other hand, sickness and the beginning of death are present when a part organises itself and withdraws from the dominion of the whole, through which isolation it affects it negatively or even forces it to organise itself solely for this potency, – as when the vitality of the entrails, obedient to the whole, forms itself into animals of their own, or the liver makes itself the ruling organ and forces the whole organisation to its function. Thus it can happen in the general system of ethical life that, e.g., the principle and system of civil right, which goes to possession and property, so deepens itself in itself

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One response to “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right”

  1. Cross-reference Avatar
    Cross-reference

    Cross-reference:
    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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