On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

…for, because the chaotic image of the necessary can contain not the absolute unity, but only the simple manifold — the atoms with the fewest possible properties — so that whatever might fall under the concept of a connecting and ordering of these, as the weakest unity of which the principle of plurality is capable, is thereby excluded from it as something first later and added on to that manifold. Now, in that division, empiricism lacks, in the first place, any criterion at all as to where the boundary between the contingent and the necessary runs — that is, what must remain in the chaos of the state of nature, or in the abstraction of man, and what must be left out; the guiding determination here can be nothing other than that just as much be contained in it as is needed for presenting what is found in actuality; the judging principle for that a priori is the a posteriori. In order to demonstrate the connection of what is to be made valid in the representation of the condition of right with the original and necessary — and thus to demonstrate it itself as necessary — one has, for this purpose, only to place a particular quality or faculty into the chaos; following the manner, common to the sciences that proceed from the empirical in general, of making hypotheses for the so-called explanation of actuality, in which this actuality, in the very same determinacy, is posited only in a wholly formal-ideal shape, as force, matter, faculty — so that the one is thereby also very easily comprehensible and explicable from the other.

On one side, this dim presentiment of an original and absolute unity, which expresses itself in the chaos of the state of nature and in the abstraction from faculties and inclinations, does not carry through to absolute negative unity, but goes only so far as the extinguishing of a great multitude of particularities and oppositions; yet there remains in it an indeterminable multitude of qualitative determinacies which, taken by themselves, have no necessity other than an empirical one, and among one another have no inner necessity; they stand only in the relation of a many, and, because this many is for one another yet without unity, are determined as opposed to one another and in absolute conflict with one another; and the separated energies of the ethical must, in the state of nature or in the abstractum of man, be thought as in a mutually annihilating war. But it is for this very reason easy to show that, since these qualities are simply opposed to one another and hence purely ideal, they cannot, in this ideality and separateness, subsist as they are supposed to, but rather sublate themselves and are reduced to nothing; empiricism, however, is unable to arrive at this absolute reflection and at the insight into the nothingness of the determinacies within the absolutely simple, so that for it the many nothing remains a multitude of realities.

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  1. Editorial Note Avatar
    Editorial Note

    Editorial Note:

    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    • p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    • p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    • p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    • p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    • p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    • p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    • p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    • p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    • p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    • p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    • p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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