[p. 519]
|519| self-contradictory if for the right of nations the relation of absolutely self-subsistent and free peoples, which are ethical totalities, is to be determined according to the relation of the civil contract, which goes immediately to the individuality and dependence of the subjects. Thus the right of the state too could relate as such simply to the individual and, as a perfect police, want wholly to permeate the being of the individual and so annihilate civil freedom, which would be the harshest despotism; as Fichte wants all doing and being of the individual as such to be supervised, known and determined by the universal and abstraction opposed to him. The moral principle too could want to force its way into the system of absolute ethical life and place itself at the head of public as well as private right and also of the right of nations, – which would be as much the greatest weakness as the deepest despotism and the total loss of the Idea of an ethical organisation, since the moral principle, like that of civil right, is only in the finite and the individual.
Just as in science such a fixing and isolating of the individual principles and their systems, and their encroachment upon others, is prevented by philosophy alone, in that the part does not recognise its limit but rather must have the tendency to constitute itself as a whole and an absolute, whereas philosophy, in the Idea of the whole, stands above the parts and thereby both holds each within its limit and also, through the loftiness of the Idea itself, prevents the part from proliferating, in its partitioning, into endless pettiness; so too in reality this restricting and positing-as-ideal of the potencies presents itself as the history of the ethical totality, in which it, firm in its absolute equilibrium, both sways up and down in time between the opposed

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