grundlinien.de

On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

[p. 515]

|515| this opposed one can and must immediately be equally present and be pointed out. That + A has no sense without relation to a – A, from this it is to be proved that with + A there is immediately – A, which the opponent then grasps in such a way that rather – A is present here than + A; but to his – A just this can be retorted. Often, however, even this trouble is not taken and, e.g., of the freedom opposed to the sensuous incentives, which for the sake of this opposition is just as little a true freedom, it is not shown that everything that would be explained as an expression of this freedom must properly be explained as an effect of the sensuous incentives, which can very well be done, but no more than can be shown again on the contrary that what is supposed to be experienced as an effect of the sensuous incentive must properly be experienced as an effect of freedom, but freedom is directly abstracted from and asserted not to belong here at all, because it is something inner, still more something moral and indeed something metaphysical, but without considering that the other determinacy, at which one stops, namely coercion and the sensuous incentive, through which it is supposed to be posited as something external, has no meaning at all without the opposed inner or freedom and that this is absolutely inseparable from coercion. The action which is a crime, viewed from the side that thereby, contrary to the threatened punishment and to the sensuous incentive which the law sets up by this threat, something determinate is willed, this determinate is called something sensuous, and one will say that it is a sensuous stimulus from which the crime derives; but from the side that the action is a willing, and the possibility in it of abstracting from the sensuous incentive of the law, it appears as free, and no view, neither that determinacy nor this possibility, can be left out,

Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

DE

Comments

One response to “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right”

  1. Cross-reference Avatar
    Cross-reference

    Cross-reference:
    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

Leave a Reply