On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

But on another side there is the other comedy; whose complications are without fate and without a true struggle, because the ethical nature is itself caught up in that very complication; the knots are tied here not in playful, but in opposites that are serious for this ethical drive, though comic for the spectator, and deliverance from them is sought in an affectation of character and absoluteness that finds itself constantly deceived and deposed. The ethical drive, (for it is not the conscious absolute ethical nature that is at play in this comedy) must, to put it briefly, transform what subsists into the formal and negative absoluteness of right, and thereby give its anxiety the opinion of firmness for its possession, raise its belongings through treaties and contracts and every conceivable clause to something secure and certain, deduce the systems concerning this from experience and reason, as though from certainty and necessity itself, and ground them with the most profound reasonings — but, like the subterranean spirits in the poet who saw the plantations they had laid out in the infernal wastes swept away by the next storm-wind, so too, through the next turning or even the uprising of the earth-spirit, whole and half sciences are washed away that had been proven from experience and reason, one system of right supplanted by another, here humanity taking the place of harshness, there at the same time the will of power taking the place of contractual security, and, in the domain of science as in actuality, the most rightfully acquired and most assured possessions of principles and rights laid waste — and either they suppose that it is their own endeavors, hovering above fate with reason and will, that toil away in such material, and that had brought forth such changes; or else they grow indignant at these changes as something unexpected and improper, and first call upon all the gods against such necessity, and then submit to it; in both cases the ethical drive, which seeks an absolute infinity in these finitudes, yields only the farce of its faith and its undying self-deception, which is darkest precisely where it is brightest, already in loss and wrong where it supposes itself to be resting in the arms of justice, reliability, and enjoyment itself.

Comedy separates the two zones of the ethical from one another in such a way that it lets each hold sway purely for itself, so that in the one the oppositions and the finite are an essence-less shadow, but in the other the absolute is a self-deception; but the true and absolute relation is that the one shines in earnest into the other, each stands in bodily relation to the other, and they are for one another, reciprocally, the serious fate; the absolute relation is thus set up in tragedy.

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  1. Editorial Note Avatar
    Editorial Note

    Editorial Note:

    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    • p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    • p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    • p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    • p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    • p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    • p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    • p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    • p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    • p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    • p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    • p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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