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On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

[p. 475]

|475| with that determinacy not the mere possibility but real power would have to be connected; but since this is in the hands of the other representation of the common will, the latter is capable of preventing any such determinacy and of annulling, whatever functions be entrusted to the ephorate, the supervising, the public declaration of the interdict, and whatever formalities be hatched – and indeed with the same right as those in whose hands the effectiveness of this determinacy would be placed, for these ephors are no less at the same time private wills than those, and whether the private will of the latter has separated itself from the universal will, about this the government can judge just as well as the ephorate about it, and at the same time make this judgement absolutely valid. As is well known, on the occasion of a dissolution, undertaken in recent times by a government, of a legislative power that was rivalling and paralysing it, a man who had himself been implicated in it judged, rightly, regarding the notion that the establishment of a supervisory commission similar to the Fichtean ephorate would have prevented such an act of violence, that such a council, exercising supervision and wanting to oppose the government, would have been treated just as violently. – Finally, however, if the supreme holders of power were voluntarily to permit these second representatives of the universal will to summon the community, so that it might judge between them and the supervisors – what would be done with such a rabble, which is supervised even in everything that is a private matter, still less leads a public life, and which is hence cultivated not at all to the consciousness of the common will and to acting in the spirit of a whole, but solely to the opposite.

What has hereby been shown is that the ethical, which is posited solely according to the relation, or externality and coercion, thought as totality, sublates itself. It is thereby indeed proved that coercion is nothing

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One response to “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right”

  1. Cross-reference Avatar
    Cross-reference

    Cross-reference:
    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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