[p. 466]
|466| universal legislation, will prove to be false, for it annihilates itself. If it is thought that the poor are helped universally, then there are either no poor at all any more or nothing but poor, and then there remain none who can help, and so in both cases the help would fall away; the maxim thus, thought as universal, sublates itself. But should the determinacy which is the condition of the sublating, namely poverty, remain, then the possibility of help remains, but as possibility, not as actuality, as the maxim states; if poverty is to remain so that the duty to help the poor can be exercised, then through that letting-remain of poverty the duty is immediately not fulfilled. Thus the maxim to defend one’s fatherland against enemies with honour, and infinitely many more, sublate themselves when thought as the principle of a universal legislation; for that one, e.g., thus extended, sublates the determinacy of a fatherland as well as of the enemies and of the defence.
Just as little as unity has the pure negative meaning of the mere sublating of determinacies, just as little is it the true unity of intuition or the positive indifference of determinacies, and the comparison with the latter will make the perverted essence of that unity clearer from another side. That unity of practical reason, namely, is essentially affected with a difference; be it that it is posited as the fixing of a determinacy, then others are immediately excluded by this, posited negatively, or as an analytic proposition, then the identity of it, this its form, contradicts its content. Which can also be grasped thus: as a proposition it contradicts, with its content, the demand made on the proposition to be a judgement; something was supposed to be said with the proposition, but with the identical proposition nothing is said, for it is not a judgement, because the relation of subject to predicate is merely formal and no difference of them at all is posited. Or let the unity be taken as universality, then it has altogether

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