On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

exclude a negative treatment of the system of possession, and would let it have entirely free rein and establish itself absolutely; rather, the ethical whole must keep it in the feeling of its own inner nullity, and must hinder its shooting-up in respect of quantity, and its formation toward an ever greater difference and inequality — which is what its nature tends toward; something which is also brought about, in every state, more unconsciously and in the shape of an external natural necessity which the state would itself wish to be exempt from — through the ever greater expenditure of the state itself, growing along with the growth of the system of possession, and, correspondingly, rising levies, and hence a diminishing of possessions and a hindering of acquisition — brought about most of all through war, which throws whatever tends in that direction into manifold confusion, as well as through the jealousy of other estates, and the oppression of trade, in part deliberately, in part against their will through lack of understanding, and so forth — brought about, that is, to such degrees as allow the positive ethical life of the state itself, its independence from the purely real system, and the assertion of a negative and restraining bearing.

The reality in the relation in which it has just now been considered, and of which physical need, enjoyment, possession, and the objects of possession and enjoyment are different sides, is pure reality; it merely expresses the extremes of the relationship. But the relationship also contains an ideality, a relative identity of the opposed determinacies; and this can therefore not be positively absolute, but only formal. Through the identity into which the real is posited in the relation of relationships, possession becomes property, and particularity in general — even living particularity — is at the same time determined as a universal; whereby the sphere of right is constituted. — As for the reflection of the Absolute in this relationship, it has already been determined above, on its negative side, against the subsistence of the real and determinate, as a subduing; on the positive side, for the subsistence of the real, indifference in this determinate material can express itself only as an external, formal equality; and the science that relates to this can only aim, in part, at the gradations of inequality, and, in part, in order that this be possible, at determining the manner in which something living, or inward in general, is to be posited so objectively and externally that it becomes capable of that determination and calculation. Against this superficial appearance, the absolute reality of ethical life, in this power, is restricted by the subsistence of the reality present in the opposition. Not only does the equating and calculating of inequality have its limits, for the sake of the fixed determinacy which encloses within itself an absolute opposition, and strike, as geometry does, upon incommensurability, but, because it is wholly within determinacy, and yet cannot, like

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  1. Editorial Note Avatar
    Editorial Note

    Editorial Note:

    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    • p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    • p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    • p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    • p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    • p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    • p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    • p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    • p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    • p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    • p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    • p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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