[p. 100]
|100| substance there is no difference. With the difference of God from the world, in particular from man, the difference of good and evil enters. In Spinozism, with regard to this difference of God and man, it is the basic determination that man must have God alone as his goal. There, for difference, for man, the law is the love of God, to be directed to this love of God alone, not to assert one’s difference, not to want to persist in it, but to have one’s direction only towards God.
That is the most sublime morality: that evil is the null and man is not to let this difference, this nullity, count. Man can want to persist in this difference, drive this difference to opposition against God, the universal in and for itself, – then he is evil. But he can also regard his difference as null, place his truth only in God and his direction towards God, – then he is good.
In Spinozism, admittedly, distinctness of good and evil enters – God and man over against each other – and enters with this determination, that evil is to be regarded as the null. In God as such, in this determination as substance, the difference is not; but for man this difference is, also that between good and evil.
This superficiality with which polemic is made against philosophy also says that philosophy is a system of identity. It is quite correct: substance is this one identity with itself, but so equally is spirit. Identity, unity with itself, is in the end everything. But if one speaks of philosophy of identity, one stops at abstract identity, unity in general, and disregards what alone matters, the determination of this unity within itself, whether it is determined as substance or as spirit. The whole of philosophy is nothing other than the study of the determinations of unity; likewise the philosophy of religion is a sequence
