[p. 217]
|217| certainty. In this certainty of myself, in which my conviction, my faith has its source and its place, I am free for myself against others, whatever kind faith itself may be; or the determinate grounds, reflections and feelings on which it is built are indifferent here. Admittedly faith in itself is still unfree as regards content, and it is only thinking that seeks to be free with regard to content as well.
Here now, where freedom also relates to content, here it is that the break between thinking and faith comes forth, this break that we already see in Greece at the time of Socrates. Thinking is a new relation against faith. The side of form, namely, enters into relation against the substantial element of truth. In the Christian religion this principle is present from the beginning; it does indeed begin on the one hand from an external history that is believed, but at the same time this history has the meaning of being the explication of the nature of God. Christ, according to the distinction that at once enters there, is not only a man who had this fate, but he is also the Son of God. The explication of the history of Christ is then the deeper; it has happened in thought and has brought forth dogmatics, the doctrine of the church. With this the demand of inwardness, of thinking, is present. The break of thinking and faith then develops further. Thinking knows itself free, not only as regards form, but also with regard to content. In thinking, however, freedom is not without authority; it has certain principles which are indeed its own and to which it reduces everything: but these principles themselves belong to development; an age has certain principles, and to that extent there is also authority in it. The last analysis, where there are no more presupposed principles, is only the advance to philosophy.
