[p. 206]
|206| peculiarity.
With the concept stated one can also be reminded of another representation or of the bare accusation of pantheism, which is made against that concept even by theologians. For there are also theologians who themselves often, when they otherwise think they have removed themselves very far from it, are so bound to the highway of the common culture of reflection of our time that, if they do not see God spoken of in the position of being determined as an absolute beyond, their thought does not know how to get further than to grasp such affirmative relation only as common, abstract identity. One does not know how to know God as spirit; spirit is an empty representation, synonymous only with rigid, abstract substance. Pantheism sees and knows God in the sun, the stone, the tree, the animal only insofar as the sun as sun, the tree as tree, the animal as such is and persists in this immediate, natural existence. The sun, the air etc. are in fact also universal matter; still more the plant, the animal are life, and if one knows no higher determination of God than that of universal being, universal life, universal substance and the like, such existences contain this so-called divine essence, and indeed as a spiritless universal. Likewise, if single self-consciousness is determined as a natural, simple thing, in which determination the soul is usually understood, it likewise enters into the pantheistic view of taking it as divine existence; but likewise if self-consciousness, though not as a natural thing, is taken as something actual according to immediacy, so that it would truly be as immediately knowing, as thinking according to its merely original determinacy, – if it is thus taken in this sense for a divine actuality, it is also still taken up into that
