Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Concept of Religion

[p. 127]

|127| therefore between the determinacy of their opposition and their oneness and satisfaction, and is distinguished according to how the relationship of my subjectivity to the universal is determined by the particular mode of my interest in which I happen to exist. The relation of the universal and of empirical self-consciousness can accordingly be of very different kinds: highest tension and hostility of the extremes and highest oneness. In the determinacy of separation, in which the universal is the substantial against which empirical consciousness feels itself and at the same time its essential nullity, but according to its positive existence still wants to remain what it is, there is the feeling of fear. One’s own inner existence and disposition, feeling itself as null, and self-consciousness, at the same time on the side of the universal and condemning that existence, gives the feeling of repentance, of pain over oneself. The empirical existence of self-consciousness, feeling itself furthered as a whole or in some respect, and indeed not, say, through its own self-activity, but through a connection and power lying outside its strength and prudence, which is thought as the universal in and for itself and to which that furtherance is ascribed, gives the feeling of gratitude and so on. The higher oneness of my self-consciousness in general with the universal, the certainty, security and feeling of this identity, is love, blessedness.

c) If now, in this progress of feeling to reflection and in the distinguishing of the I and its determinacy, so that this appears as content and object, feeling is given the position that it is in itself already the justification of the content and the proof of its being or truth, the following is to be remarked. Feeling can have the most manifold content of all; we have feeling of right, of wrong, God, colour, hatred, enmity, joy and so on; the most contradictory content is found in it: the basest and the highest,

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