[p. 230]
|230| to regain the goodwill of the gods, which was originally present. Here misfortune constitutes the separation; it concerns only the natural sphere, the external condition as regards bodily existence, namely that these external circumstances are not as the claims to happiness demand. The presupposition is that this natural condition is not a contingent one but depends on a higher power that determines itself as God; God has posited it, brought it forth. A further determination is that this will which decrees the misfortune stands in a moral connection, so that it goes well or ill with a person or a people because that person or people has deserved it through their guilt. That is why the course of nature is disturbed against human purposes, so that it opposes their benefit and happiness as hostile. In the case of this separation it is required to restore the oneness of the divine will with human purposes. The cult thus takes the shape of atonement: this is accomplished through acts of remorse and penance, through sacrifices and ceremonies, by which the human being shows that he is in earnest about giving up his particular will.
Underlying this is in general the intuition that God is the power over nature, that nature depends on a higher will. The question that arises here is only to what extent the divine will presents itself in natural events, how it is to be recognized in them. At this standpoint the presupposition holds that the power of nature is not only natural but contains purposes within itself that are alien to it as such, namely purposes of the good, which concern the well-being of human beings and on which that well-being depends. This we too acknowledge as true; but the good is the abstract, universal; when people speak of their good, they have quite particular purposes for themselves, and so they grasp it in
