[p. 207]
|207| pantheistic view. And this representation cannot free itself from such a determination of the single self-conscious being. I am, I am thinking: this form of immediate being that representing grasps as what makes up the last definition and the persisting shape of the thinking one. Even if it is also called spirit, it remains a senseless word, since that merely existing I, that merely immediate knowing – immediately knowing whatever it may be, even God – is only spiritless spirit as yet.
It is from this grasping of spirit as spiritless that the two assertions flow: that man can know of God only immediately, and that he is, as original, good by nature. Or conversely, if these two assertions are made, it follows that spirit is taken only as existing I and this existing I as the last true determination of self-consciousness and even as absolute eternal being. Spirit is only spirit as concrete freedom, as letting its naturalness or immediacy dissolve in its universality in general or more determinately in its essence as its object, sinking its natural singularity, determining itself as finite, into the matter, i.e. here the absolute content determining itself as object. If, in the immediacy to be given up, one thinks only of bodily immediacy, giving it up represents itself partly as natural death, through which man could be united with God, – partly, however, as thinking, which abstracts from sensuous life and sensuous representations and is a withdrawal into the free region of the supersensuous; but if it here stops at itself as abstract thinking, it keeps for itself the reflected vanity of simple, immediate being-for-itself, of the brittle One of the existing I, which behaves exclusively against its essence and negates it within itself. It is rightly said of this I that
