[p. 132]
|132| and circumstances in which those manifold relations are not present for representation. Representation is supposed to forget the object, – and forgetting is more for hatred than forgiving, as in love it is more than merely becoming unfaithful, and being forgotten more than merely being unheard. Man as spirit, because he is not merely animal, is in feeling at the same time essentially knowing, consciousness, and he knows of himself only by taking himself back out of immediate identity with the determinacy. If, therefore, religion is supposed to be only as feeling, it fades away into what is without representation as into what is without action, and loses all determinate content.
Indeed, feeling is so far from being that in which alone and truly we could find God that, if we were to find this content in it, we would have to know it already from elsewhere. And if it is said that we cannot cognize God, cannot know anything of him, how are we then to say that he is in feeling? We must first have looked around elsewhere in consciousness for determinations of the content that is distinct from the I; only then can we demonstrate feeling as religious, insofar, namely, as we find again these determinations of the content in it.
In recent times one no longer speaks of the heart, but of conviction. With the heart one still expresses one’s immediate character; but when one speaks of acting according to conviction, there lies in it that the content is a power that governs me; it is my power, and I am its; but this power rules me in the mode of inwardness, in such a way that it is already more mediated by thought and insight.
As regards in particular the point that the heart is the germ of its content, this can be wholly admitted; but not much is said with it. It is the source, that means perhaps: it is the first mode in which such content
