[p. 216]
|216| truth; but it can also take the form that peoples compel others to submit to their faith; faith thus becomes compelling state power, partly within the state itself, partly also outwards. This collision has caused countless wars. Here belong, e.g., the wars of the Mohammedans, the religious wars between Catholics and Protestants, also the courts against heretics, further the battles among the Indians between the worshippers of Shiva and Vishnu. It is the honour of God for which one fights in such collisions, that God be acknowledged in consciousness and the truth of the people come to be acknowledged. Against such compulsion freedom of faith in general rises up; but this freedom can then also give itself more precisely the position of standing above the different content that asserts itself as truth. As formal in this way it is what freedom of faith as such is, where what is believed is supposed to remain out of the game. That is then the formal demand of freedom, which does not look to the truth of faith and relates only to subjective freedom; the content may be of whatever constitution. There the difference enters between the inner, the place of conscience, in which I am with myself, and the essential content. The inner is the holy, the place of my freedom, which is to be respected; that is an essential demand that man makes insofar as the consciousness of freedom awakens in him. The ground here is no longer the substantial content of faith, but the formal element of faith.
Freedom of faith, however, at once appears as a contradiction in itself when one considers the matter from abstract thinking; for in precisely believing, one accepts something given, present; but freedom demands that this be posited, produced by me. But in that demand for freedom faith is in fact grasped as my personal faith, as my very own and innermost
