[p. 241]
|241| than such religious views. Human activity is on the one hand represented as something unholy; on the other hand it is even demanded of the human being that, if he has a possession, he not only not increase it by his activity but give it away to the poor and especially to the church, that is, to those who do nothing, do not work. What is held in high esteem in life as rectitude is thus rejected as unholy.
Thirdly: the highest ethical life in the state rests on the rational universal will being put into action; in the state the subject has his freedom; it is actualized there. Against this a religious duty is set up according to which freedom may not be the final purpose for the human being; rather he is to submit to a strict obedience, persist in will-lessness, and more still, he is to be selfless even in his conscience, in his faith; in the deepest inwardness he is to renounce himself and cast away his self.
When religion in this way lays claim to human activity, it can give him peculiar prescriptions opposed to the rationality of the world. Against this, worldly wisdom has arisen, which knows the true in actuality; in the consciousness of spirit the principles of its freedom have awakened, and then the claims of freedom have come into conflict with the religious principles that demanded that renunciation. In the Catholic states religion and state thus stand opposed to each other when subjective freedom opens up in the human being.
In this opposition religion expresses itself only in a negative way and demands of the human being that he renounce all freedom; this opposition is more precisely this, that the human being in his actual consciousness is in general in himself without rights, and religion recognizes no absolute rights in the domain of actual ethical life. This is the enormous difference that has thereby entered the modern world,
