[p. 227]
|227| contingent and external one. From this arises what is painful in this cult. If there is or was a sense in those ceremonies and combinations, it is a trivial and superficial one, and as such actions become habit, they lose even the little sense they may have had.
At this standpoint there now also arises determinate punishment, insofar as an act opposed to a determinate prescription is to be sublated and a transgression is at issue. The punishment for such a violation is again a violation, and something is given up: life, property, and so on. But here this punishment has the sense of a wholly dry, formal punishment in the manner of civil punishment. This, however, is not immediately concerned with the improvement of the criminal, whereas ecclesiastical penance in our sense is a punishment whose essential purpose is the improvement and conversion of the one punished. At this standpoint punishment cannot have such a moral or rather religious sense. Civil and state laws are here altogether identical with the religious laws. The law of the state is a law of freedom, presupposes personality, human dignity, and relates essentially to the will; a sphere of arbitrariness remains for deciding contingent, indifferent things. At this standpoint, however, this separation is not yet present, and in general a condition of mere necessity prevails.
From the finite being and doing that the cult just described brings into relation with what is in and for itself, a further determined doing now also separates itself, one that is purposive. Whereas the performance of the actions that relate immediately to our need does not happen according to a purpose but is immediately regulated, purposive doing, by contrast, is not merely needy doing according to habit; it determines itself
