[p. 124]
|124| call knowing, and so God is; feeling thus receives the position of ground. The form of knowing is the first, then the differences; and with this the differences between the two enter and the reflection that being is my being, belongs to me. And then there is the need that the object too is in this being that I take for myself: this, then, is feeling. One is thus referred to feeling.
I feel something hard; when I speak thus, the I is the one, the second is the something: there are two of them. The expression of consciousness, the common element, is hardness. There is hardness in my feeling, and the object too is hard. This community exists in feeling; the object touches me, and I am filled with its determinacy. When I say: I and the object, both are still for themselves; only in feeling does the double being vanish. The determinacy of the object becomes mine, and indeed so much mine that reflection against the object at first falls away entirely; insofar as the other remains independent, it is not felt, tasted. But I, who am determined in feeling, behave immediately in it; I am in feeling as this single empirical I, and the determinacy belongs to this empirical self-consciousness.
In itself, then, a difference is contained in feeling. On the one side I am, the universal, the subject, and this clear, pure fluidity, this immediate reflection into me, is clouded by an other; but in this other I preserve myself completely with myself; the alien determination becomes fluid in my universality, and what is an other to me I make mine. When another quality is posited in the lifeless, this thing too has received another quality; but I, as feeling, preserve myself in the other that penetrates into me, and remain I in the determinacy. The difference of feeling is at first an inner one in the I itself; it is the difference between me in my pure fluidity and me in my determinacy. This inner difference, however, is also
