Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Concept of Religion

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a) The beginning as abstract, as the first content, universality, thus still has, as it were, a subjective position, has the position as if the universal were so universal only for the beginning and did not remain in this universality. The beginning of the content, however, is itself to be grasped in such a way that in all further developments of this content – as this universal will show itself to be something absolutely concrete, full of content, rich – we at the same time do not step out of this universality, so that this universality, which we on the one hand leave as regards form, in that it goes on to a determinate development, nevertheless preserves itself as absolute, lasting foundation and is not to be taken as a merely subjective beginning.

God is for us, insofar as he is the universal, in relation to development what is closed within itself, in absolute unity with itself. When we say: God is what is closed, this is expressed in relation to a development that we expect; but closedness, what we have called the universality of God, is in this relation to God himself, to the content itself, not to be grasped as an abstract universality outside which the particular, against which the particular would still be independent.

So now this universality is to be grasped as the absolutely full, fulfilled one. God as this universal, what is concrete, full in itself, is this, that God is only One, and not in opposition to many gods; rather there is only the One, God.

The things, developments of the natural and spiritual world, are manifold shapes, infinitely many-formed existence; they have a being of differing degree, force, strength, content. But the being of all these things is such as is not independent, but absolutely only a borne, posited being, does not have true independence. When we ascribe a being to particular things, it is only a borrowed being, only the semblance of a being, not the absolutely independent being that God is.

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