[p. 188]
|188| has not yet renounced itself, so that this determination of the objectively universal as such is not yet sufficient. It is rather required that the abstractly universal also have a content, determinations within itself; only thus is it present for me as being in and for itself. If it is empty, the determinacy is only a meant one; it falls to me; all content remains to me; all activity, all liveliness, determining and objectifying is only mine; I have only a dead, empty God, a so-called highest being, and this emptiness, this representation, remains only subjective, does not bring it to true objectivity. On this latter standpoint there is only certainty, but no truth, and I can in it still remain wholly determined as this one, finite. Objectivity is then only semblance.
Not merely for philosophy is the object full of content; rather this is something common to philosophy and religion; a difference in the view of the two is not yet present here.
To this the question attaches: how is the subject determined in it? It is determined as thinking in relation to the acknowledged object. Thinking is the activity of the universal, having a universal as object; here the universal is supposed to be the absolutely universal. The relation to such an object is therefore the thinking of the subject; the object is the essence, what is for the subject. The thought is not merely subjective, but also objective.
In thought about the matter, reflecting, I am subjective, have my thoughts about it; thinking the matter, thinking its thought, the relation of myself as particular as against the matter is taken away, and I behave objectively; I have in this renounced myself as this one according to his particularity and am universal; this and thinking that the universal is my object is the same; I here renounce myself actualiter, realiter.
