[p. 194]
|194| relationship is found in observation, it is impossible to know of the absolute, of truth. Something more is to be remarked about this turn.
If one takes possibility and impossibility in general, insofar as they have a determinate sense, both concern the inner, the concept of an object, what it is in itself; they must therefore be decided by the nature of the concept itself. On the standpoint of consciousness as observing, on this standpoint of observation, however, one cannot speak of the inner, of the concept, for it renounces knowing what concerns the inner; it has before it only what falls into external consciousness as such. Possibility and impossibility thus do not fall into this sphere.
But this standpoint claims that precisely what is, i.e. what falls into this perceiving consciousness, is what provides the standard of possibility and from this the concept of it; what goes against experience is impossible.
Against this it is to be remarked that this observing arbitrarily restricts itself to the sphere of finite consciousness. But there are still other spheres that can be observed, not merely this one whose content is only finite against finite, but such where the divine is in consciousness as being in and for itself. The affirmative consciousness of the absolute in the form of unprejudiced religiosity, of devotion, or in the form of philosophical cognition can also be observed and gives a wholly different result from the standpoint of finite consciousness, whether the observing subject now observes these higher forms of consciousness in others or in himself. For given the perversity of that standpoint it may well be that religious sensation is more affirmative and richer in substance than consciousness: there can be more in the heart than in consciousness insofar as it is determinate, cognizing, observing consciousness; the two can be different. What matters is only to bring cognition in consciousness
