Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Concept of Religion

[p. 133]

|133| appears in the subject, its first place and seat. At first man perhaps has religious feeling, perhaps not. In the former case the heart is admittedly the germ; but as with a vegetable seed grain this is the undeveloped mode of existence of the plant, so too feeling is this enveloped mode.

This seed grain, however, with which the life of the plant begins, is even only in appearance, empirically, the first; for it is equally product, result, the last; it is the result of the fully developed life of the tree and encloses this complete development of the nature of the tree within itself. That originality is thus only a relative one.

Thus in feeling too this whole content is in our subjective actuality in this enveloped way; but it is something quite different that this content as such belongs to feeling as such. Such content as God is a content universal in and for itself; likewise the content of right and duty is a determination of the rational will.

I am will, not only desire; I do not only have inclination. The I is the universal; but as will I am in my freedom, in my universality itself, in the universality of my self-determination, and if my will is rational, its determining is in general a universal one, a determining according to the pure concept. The rational will is very different from contingent will, from willing according to contingent drives, inclinations; the rational will determines itself according to its concept, and the concept, the substance of the will, is pure freedom, and all determinations of the will that are rational are developments of freedom, and the developments that proceed from the determinations are duties.

Such content belongs to rationality; it is determination through, according to the pure concept and thus belongs equally to thinking: the will is rational only insofar as it is thinking. One must therefore give up the usual representation according to which will and intelligence are two kinds of compartments

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