[p. 242]
|242| namely that the question is asked at all whether the freedom of human beings is to be recognized as something true in and for itself or whether it may be rejected by religion.
It has already been said that agreement between religion and state can be present; this is the case in general in principle, but in an abstract way, in the Protestant states; for Protestantism demands that the human being believe only what he knows, that his conscience be inviolable as something holy; in divine grace the human being is nothing passive; he is essentially involved with his subjective freedom, and in his knowing, willing, believing the moment of subjective freedom is expressly demanded. In the states of another religion, by contrast, it can be that the two sides do not agree, that religion is different from the principle of the state; this we see in a widely extended circle: on the one hand a religion that does not recognize the principle of freedom, on the other a constitution that makes it its foundation. When one says that the human being is free by his nature, that is a principle of infinite worth; but if one stops at this abstraction, it allows no organism of the constitution to arise, for this requires an articulation in which duties and rights are limited; that abstraction admits no inequality, which must come in if an organism and thereby true liveliness is to take place.
Such principles are true, but they must not be taken in their abstraction; the knowledge that the human being is free by nature, that is, according to the concept, belongs to modern times; but whether one stops at the abstraction or not, it can be that these principles are confronted by religion, which does not recognize them but regards them as without right and only arbitrariness as rightful. Thus a struggle necessarily arises which cannot be settled
