[p. 129]
|129| the concept. It is therefore in its essence the particular, the restricted, and it is indifferent that it is this content, since another content too can be in my feeling. If, then, the being of God is demonstrated in our feeling, it is as contingent in it as anything else to which this being can belong. That we then call subjectivity, but in the worst sense; personality, self-determination, the highest intensity of spirit within itself is also subjectivity, but in a higher sense, in a freer form; here, however, subjectivity means only contingency.
People often appeal to their feeling when reasons run out. Such a person one must leave standing; for with the appeal to one’s own feeling community among us is broken off. On the ground of thought, of the concept, on the other hand, we are on that of the universal, of rationality; there we have the nature of the matter before us, and about it we can come to an understanding, since we submit to the matter and it is what we have in common. But if we go over to feeling, we leave this common element and withdraw into the sphere of our contingency and merely watch how the matter is found there. In this sphere each then makes the matter his matter, his particularity, and if the one demands: you ought to have such feelings, the other can answer: I simply do not have them, I just am not like that; for that demand concerns only my contingent being, which can be thus or thus.
Feeling is further what man has in common with the animal: it is the animal, sensuous form. If, then, what right, ethical life, God are is pointed out in feeling, this is the worst way in which such a content can be demonstrated. God is essentially in thinking. The suspicion that he is through thinking, only in thinking, must already arise in us from the fact that only man has religion, not the animal.
