[p. 150]
|150| needs. I am also concretely determined in a wholly simple, universal way, so that the determinacy in me is pure simple determinacy. I.e. I am absolutely concrete I, thinking determining itself within itself – I am as the concept. This is another way in which I am concrete; there I seek not only reassurance for my heart, but the concept seeks satisfaction, and it is against this that the religious content in the mode of representation retains the form of externality. Even if many a great and rich mind and many a deep sense has found satisfaction in religious truth, it is nevertheless the concept, this thinking concrete within itself, that is not yet satisfied and asserts itself first as the drive of rational insight. If the word “reason, rational insight”, still indeterminate in itself, is not merely reduced to something being certain in me as an external determination, but thinking has determined itself to this, that the object stands firm for me for itself and is grounded in itself, then it is the concept as universal thinking, which particularizes itself within itself and in particularization remains identical with itself. Whatever further content I have in the rational with regard to will, intelligence: what is always substantial is that such content is known by me as grounded in itself, that I have in it the consciousness of the concept, i.e. not only conviction, certainty and conformity with principles otherwise held to be true, under which I subsume it, but that I have in it truth as truth, in the form of truth – in the form of the absolutely concrete and of what agrees absolutely and purely within itself.
Thus representation dissolves into the form of thinking, and that determination of form is what philosophical cognition adds to truth. But it is evident from this that philosophy is concerned with nothing less than overthrowing religion and now perhaps asserting that the content of religion cannot be
