[p. 192]
|192|
According to this consideration the two infinities are to be well distinguished: the true one and the merely bad one of the understanding. So, then, the finite is a moment of divine life.
c. Transition to the Speculative Concept of Religion
For the developed rational consideration of the finite the simple forms of a proposition no longer count. “God is infinite, I finite”: these are false, bad expressions, forms not adequate to what the Idea is, what the nature of the matter is. The finite is not what is; likewise the infinite is not fixed: these determinations are only moments of the process. God is just as much as finite, and the I just as much as infinite. The “is” which in such propositions is regarded as something fixed has, grasped in its truth, no other sense than only that of activity, liveliness and spirituality.
Predicates too do not suffice for determination, least of all one-sided and merely passing ones. Rather what is true and the Idea is altogether only as movement. Thus God is this movement within himself and only thereby alone a living God. But this subsisting of finitude must not be held fast, but sublated: God is the movement to the finite and thereby, as its sublation, to himself; in the I, as what sublates itself as finite, God returns to himself and is God only as this return. Without the world God is not God.
The ancients especially had these abstractions; they are products of the beginning of reflecting, abstract thinking. Plato, however, already recognized the infinite as the bad and the determinate as the higher, the limit limiting itself within itself as higher than the unlimited. The true is the unity of the infinite in which the finite is contained. The result is that we must free ourselves from the bogey of the
