[p. 119]
|119| when we know of something universal, but also grasp it according to its particular determination and as a connection within itself.
We cognize nature, spirit, but not this house, not this individual; the former is universal, the latter particular, and the rich content of that universal we cognize according to its necessary relation of its parts to one another.
Considered more closely, this knowing is consciousness, but wholly abstract consciousness, i.e. abstract activity of the I, whereas consciousness proper already contains further determinations of content and distinguishes these from itself as object. This knowing is thus merely this, that some content is, and it is thus the abstract relation of the I to the object, whatever the content may be. Or immediate knowing is nothing other than thinking taken quite abstractly. But thinking too is the self-identical activity of the I, thus, taken in general, immediate knowing.
More precisely, thinking is that in which its object too has the determination of something abstract, the activity of the universal. This thinking is contained in everything, however concretely one may behave; but one calls it thinking only insofar as the content has the determination of something abstract, universal.
Here now the knowing is not an immediate knowing of a bodily object, but of God; God is the wholly universal object, not some particularity, the most universal personality. Immediate knowing of God is immediate knowing of an object that is wholly universal, so that only the product is immediate; it is thus thinking of God, for thinking is the activity for which the universal is. God has here as yet no content, no further meaning; he is only nothing sensuous, a universal of which we
