[p. 121]
|121| its dry, pure, abstract relation to itself, this barren immediacy which being is. The universal is not something immediate in this sense; it is also supposed to be a particular; the universal is supposed to be in itself; this activating of itself into the particular is not the abstract, immediate. The abstractly immediate, on the other hand, this barren relation to itself, is expressed with being. When I say, then: this object is, there is thereby expressed the last peak of dry abstraction; it is the emptiest, poorest determination.
Knowing is thinking, and this is the universal and contains the determination of the abstractly universal, the immediacy of being. This is the sense of immediate knowing
We are thus in abstract logic; this always happens when one thinks one is on concrete ground, on the ground of immediate consciousness; but this is precisely the poorest in thoughts, and those contained in it are the barest, emptiest. It is the greatest ignorance to believe that immediate knowing is outside the region of thinking; one struggles with such distinctions, and considered more closely they shrink away. Even according to that poorest determination of immediate knowing, religion belongs to thought.
More precisely, we then ask whereby what I know in immediate consciousness is different from other things I know. I know nothing yet but that the universal is. What further content God has is to be spoken of in what follows. The standpoint of immediate consciousness gives no more than the being stated. That one cannot know God is the standpoint of the Enlightenment, and this coincides with immediate knowing of God. Further, however, God is an object of my consciousness; I distinguish him from myself; he is an other from me and I from him. When we
