[p. 183]
|183| arbitrary diversity of their feeling they are directed hostilely against one another with hatred and contempt.
This version of the standpoint, at the outermost, contentless peak of finite subjectivity positing itself as absolute, makes up the difficulty in grasping this standpoint.
Its first difficulty is that it is such an abstraction; the second is its approach to the philosophical concept. It borders on the philosophical standpoint, for it is the highest of reflection. It contains expressions which, looked at superficially, seem the same as those philosophy has. It contains ideality, negativity, subjectivity, and all this, considered for itself, is a true and essential moment of freedom and of the Idea. Further it contains the unity of finite and infinite; this must also be said of the Idea. Admittedly it is subjectivity that develops all objectivity out of itself and thus as form converts itself into content and only becomes true form through its true content. Notwithstanding this, however, what thus appears as nearest is the most remote from itself. This ideality, this fire in which all determinations consume themselves, is on this standpoint still incomplete negativity; I as immediate, this one, am the only reality; all other determinations are posited as ideal, burnt. Only I preserve myself, and all determinations count if I will. Only the determination of myself, and that everything is posited only through me, counts. Ideality is not carried through; this last peak still contains what must be negated: that I as this one do not have truth, reality. I alone am still positive myself, whereas everything is supposed to become affirmative only through negation. The standpoint thus contradicts itself. It posits ideality as principle, and what carries out ideality is itself not ideal.
The unity of finite and infinite that is posited in reflection is admittedly a definition of the Idea,
