[p. 122]
|122| compare other objects in this way according to what we know of them, we also know this of them: they are and are an other than we, are for themselves; they are then a universal or not, they are a universal and at the same time particular, have some determinate content. The wall is, is a thing; thing is a universal, and so much I also know of God. We know far more of other things; but if we abstract from all their determinacies and say, as just now, of the wall only: “it is”, we know as much of it as of God. So God has been called abstractly ens. But this ens is the emptiest, against which the other entia show themselves far more fulfilled.
We have said: God is in immediate knowing. We too are; to the I too this immediacy of being belongs. All other, concrete, empirical things also are, are identical with themselves; this is abstractly their being as being. This being is common with me; but the object of my knowing is so constituted that I can also abstract its being from it. I represent it to myself, believe in it; but this believed is a being only in my consciousness. Thus universality and this determination of immediacy step apart, and they must. This reflection must enter, for we are two and must be distinguished; otherwise we would be one; i.e. a determination must be attributed to the one that does not belong to the other. Such a determination is being. I am; the other, the object, therefore is not. Being I take upon myself, onto my side; I do not doubt my existence; it therefore falls away with the other. Since being is only the being of the object, so that the object is only this known being, it lacks a being in and for itself, and receives it only in consciousness; it is known only as known being, not as being in and for itself. Only the I is; the object is not. I can indeed doubt everything, but not the being of myself, for the I is what doubts, doubt
