[p. 107]
|107|
As regards the proof of this necessity, the following may suffice.
In the fact that something is to be shown as necessary there lies, then, that one starts from an other. This other of true, divine being is here undivine being, the finite world, finite consciousness. If one now begins from this as the immediate, finite, untrue, and indeed from it as an object of our knowing and as we apprehend it immediately as what it is in its determinate quality – if one thus begins from the first in this way, it shows itself in the progression not to be what it immediately presents itself as, but as destroying itself, becoming, sending itself on to an other. Of the finite with which we begin, therefore, it is not our reflection and consideration, our judgement, that tells us that it has something true as its ground; it is not we who bring its ground in; rather it shows in itself that it dissolves into an other, into something higher than it itself is. We follow the object as it goes back for itself to the source of its truth.
Since the object from which one begins perishes in its truth and sacrifices itself, it has not thereby vanished; its content is rather posited in the determination of its ideality. An example of this sublation and ideality we have in consciousness: I relate myself to an object and then consider it as it is. The object, which I at the same time distinguish from myself, is independent; I have not made it, it has not waited for me in order to be, and it remains even if I go away from it. Both, I and the object, are thus two independent things; but consciousness is at the same time the relation of these two independent things, in which both are posited as one; in my knowing of the object, these two, I and the other, are in one in my simple determinacy. If we grasp this truly, we have not only the negative result
