[p. 140]
|140| it at once has something polemical about it. The content is not grasped immediately in sensuous intuition, not in a pictorial way, but mediately by way of abstraction, and the sensuous, pictorial is raised into the universal; and with this elevation the negative behaviour towards the pictorial is then necessarily linked. This negative direction, however, concerns not only the form, so that the difference of intuition and representation would lie only in it, but it also touches the content. For intuition the Idea and the mode of presentation hang together so closely that both appear as one, and the pictorial has the meaning that the Idea is essentially tied to it and cannot be separated from it. Representation, by contrast, starts from the view that the absolutely true Idea cannot be grasped through an image and that the pictorial mode is a restriction of the content; it therefore sublates that unity of intuition, rejects the oneness of the image and its meaning, and lifts the meaning out for itself.
Finally religious representation has the meaning of truth, of objective content, and is thus directed against other modes of subjectivity, not merely against the pictorial mode. Its content is what counts in and for itself, remains substantially firm against my opinion and meaning, and is rigid against the back and forth of my wishes, my liking.
This concerns the essence of representation in general. As regards its more precise determinacy, the following is to be noted.
a) We saw that in representation the essential content is posited in the form of thought, but it is not thereby yet posited as thought. When we said, therefore, that representation is directed polemically against the sensuous and pictorial and behaves negatively towards it, this does not yet contain that it has freed itself absolutely from the sensuous and posited it ideally in a completed way. This is attained only in actual thinking, which
