[p. 125]
|125| just as much posited as such when reflection is added; I take myself back out of my determinacy, set it over against myself as other, and subjectivity is for itself in relation to objectivity.
It is usually said that feeling is something merely subjective; but I am surely subjective only against an object of intuition or representation, in setting an other over against myself. It thus seems that feeling, because in it the difference of subjectivity and objectivity has not yet entered, cannot be called subjective. In fact, however, this division, that I am subject against objectivity, is a relation and identity that is at the same time distinguished from this difference, and universality begins in it. For in relating myself to an other and distinguishing the object from myself in intuiting, representing, I am the relation of these two, myself and the other, and a distinguishing in which an identity is posited, and I relate myself to the object by overreaching it. In feeling as such, on the other hand, the I is in this immediate simple unity, in this being filled with the determinacy, and does not yet go beyond this determinacy. But thus I am, as feeling, wholly particular, sunk through and through in the determinacy, and in the proper sense only subjective without objectivity and without universality.
If now the essential religious relationship is in feeling, this relationship is identical with my empirical self. The determinacy as the infinite thinking of the universal and I as wholly empirical subjectivity are gathered together in feeling in me; I am the immediate union and resolution of the struggle of the two. But since I find myself so determined as this empirical subject and, on the contrary, find myself determined as raised into a wholly other region, and sense the passing back and forth from one to the other and their relationship, I precisely therein find myself determined against myself, or myself as
