[p. 153]
|153| unity of light and dark, and indeed in such a way that the dark is the ground and what clouds this dark is an other, something brightening, a medium through which we see this dark. The sky is night, darkness, the atmosphere bright; through this bright medium we see the blue.
Thus God as content of representation is still in the form of simplicity. Now we think this simple content; there distinct determinations are to be stated whose unity, the sum so to speak, more precisely their identity, makes up the object. The orientals say: God has an infinite multitude of names, i.e. of determinations; one cannot exhaustively state what he is. But if we are to grasp the concept of God, distinct determinations are to be given, these are to be reduced to a narrow circle, so that through them and the unity of the determinations the object is complete.
b) A closer category is: insofar as something is thought, it is posited in relation to an other; either the object [is] known within itself as relation of distinct things to one another, or as relation of itself to an other that we know outside it. In representation we always have distinct determinations, whether they belong to one whole or are set apart.
In thinking, however, there comes to consciousness their contradiction, they being supposed at the same time to make up One. If they contradict each other, it does not seem that they could belong to One. If, e.g., God is good and also just, goodness contradicts justice. Likewise: God is almighty and wise. He is thus on the one hand the power before which everything vanishes, is not; but this negation of everything determinate is a contradiction against wisdom: this wants something determinate, has a purpose, is a restriction of the indeterminate, which power is. In representation everything has its place calmly side by side: man is free, also dependent; there is good, also evil in the world. In thinking
