[p. 162]
|162|
I and God are different from each other; if both were one, there would be immediate, unmediated relation, relationless, i.e. undifferentiated unity. Since both are different, the one is not what the other is; but if they are nevertheless related, have identity at the same time as their difference, this identity is itself different from their being different, something different from these two, because otherwise they would not be different.
Both are different; their unity is not they themselves. That in which they are one is that in which they are different; but they are different, so their unity is different from their difference. Mediation is thus more precisely in a third over against the different; so we have a syllogism: two different things and a third that brings them together, in which they are mediated, identical.
It thus lies not only near but in the matter itself that, insofar as there is talk of knowing God, there is at once talk of the form of a syllogism. Both are different, and there is a unity in which both are set as one through a third: that is [a] syllogism. We thus have to speak more closely of the nature of the knowing of God, which is essentially mediated within itself. The more precise form of the knowing of God occurs under the form of proofs of the existence of God: this is the knowing of God represented as a mediated one.
Only what is one, abstractly one, is unmediated. The proofs of the existence of God present the knowing of God because it contains mediation within itself. That is religion itself, knowing of God. The explication of this knowing, which is mediated, is the explication of religion itself. But this form of proofs admittedly has something crooked about it when this knowing is represented as proving the existence of God. Against this critique has been directed; but the one-sided moment of form that is in this mediated knowing does not make the whole matter nothing. What matters is to bring the proofs of the existence of God back
